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Abstract 
Professionals such as lawyers, accountants, company secretaries and real estate agents who are under the category of 
Designated Nonfinancial Business and Professions (DNFBPs) are expected to comply with the requirements of FATF 40+9 
Recommendation. FATF recommends that DNFBPs need to comply with five major recommendations (i.e. Recommendations 
12, 16,17,20,24 and 25) to combat the prevalence of money laundering and terrorism financing. This includes the need to 1) 
conduct due diligent on their clients 2) maintain proper records and documentation of related transactions for at least six years; 
and 3) submit a suspicious transaction report to the Competent Authority, who is in charge of Anti-Money Laundering regime 
of a country. This study analyses the latest Mutual Evaluation reports of countries within the Asia Pacific Group (APG) to 
assess the level of compliance of the countries in pursuant to the compliance of DNFBPs and also analyze the characteristics of 
the compliance rating of the DNFBPs. In general, the findings show low level of compliance for these standards, implicating 
either lack of awareness or poor enforcement by the regulators. 
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1. Introduction 
Money laundering is one of the biggest problems, which is difficult to curb. Profits generated by this activities 
cause a threat not only to public safety due to the economic power accumulated by number of criminal 
organisations but also the financial systems themselves and to economic development. Global money laundering 
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imposes significant costs on the world of economy by damaging the effective operations of national economies and 
by promoting poorer economic policies (Thony, 2002). As a result, financial markets slowly become corrupted and 
the public’s confidence in the international financial system is eroded. Eventually, as financial markets become 
increasingly risky and less stable, the rate of growth of the world economy is reduced.  
Money laundering is often referred as financial crime that often involves a complex series of transactions and 
numerous financial institutions across many foreign jurisdictions. Besides the global phenomenon and 
international challenge, it is also extremely difficult to investigate and prosecute offenders of money laundering 
due to the complex series of transactions (Buchanan, 2004). Money laundering involves 3 processes; which are 
placement, layering and integration. Placement is where the cash are retained into the financial system or retail 
economy or are smuggled out of the country. In layering, the track of the funds is being disguise by creating 
complex layers of financial transactions. Lastly, the money is integrated into the legitimate economic and financial 
system and is adjusted with all other assets in the system. (Buchanan, 2004).  
Efforts to launder money and finance terrorism have been evolving rapidly in recent years. Many efforts had 
been done in reducing the prevalence of these activities. But first, one need to understand that the money 
launderers apply these 3 steps by using a legitimate institution  as a proxy to cover the movement of illegal 
proceeds and thus financing the terrorist activities (Kersten, 2003). Due to this, FATF had lay out some preventive 
measures to combat money laundering and financial terrorism especially focusing on the preventive measures for 
Designated Non-financial Business and Professions (DNFBPs). After all, prevention is better than cure. 
Traditionally, the financial sector is often seen as the gatekeepers of the Anti-money Laundering/Counter 
Terrorism Financing regime. Increasingly, governments and law enforcement agencies have recognised the 
importance of designated non-financial businesses and professions in the fight against money laundering and 
terrorism financing activities as they are the professions which encounter this kind of activities (Choo, 2014). 
Thus, it is crucial to understand the recommendations suggested to this group and also to see the level of 
compliance of the DNFBPs in the countries. 
As in Internal Revenue Service in its website (Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 2013), shows some of examples 
of money laundering investigations written from public record documents in which the cases were prosecuted. One 
of the cases is about money laundering committed by lawyer (one of profession in DNFBPs). In April 2, 2014, 
Derian Eidson, of Yorba Linda, a lawyer, was sentenced to 121 months in prison and ordered to pay a $200,000 
fine in Sacramento, Calif. Eidson, a suspended member of the California bar, was convicted at trial on two counts 
of money laundering. According to court documents, Eidson was an insurance defense lawyer in 2001 when she 
met Steven Zinnel, a Sacramento businessman. The two concealed Zinnel's assets during his child support 
litigation and personal bankruptcy cases. In the course of the scheme, Eidson used her attorney client trust account 
to conceal funds. In addition, Zinnel and Eidson established a shell company, Done Deal, for the purpose of 
receiving distributions from Zinnel’s silent partnership in an electrical infrastructure company. Keeping Done Deal 
and the Done Deal bank account in Eidson’s name allowed Zinnel to conceal his ownership interest in the 
company from the bankruptcy court and family court. Zinnel was sentenced on March 4, 2014, to 212 months in 
prison for his role in the scheme. From these cases, although the lawyers had been entrusted to ensure legality of 
activities, they had misused their powers and gain benefit for themselves through illegal activities. 
These case shows that it is crucial for the people to study on this group as the society could either manipulate 
the professionals’ position or the professional itself could misused their professions which is seen as professional 
and ethical to commit money laundering and terrorism financing. Findings of this study shows that most of the 
countries are still lacking in terms of identifying the ill-intent consumer, making a report in terms of suspicious 
transaction and also monitoring and supervising although in terms of moderning the transaction techniques they 
are quite updated. But still, there is a gap for the launderers to commit the illegal activities if it is not been captured 
wisely. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews relevant prior researches. Section 3 describes the 
research method. Section 4 is on findings and discussion. Section 5 presents the concluding remarks and future 
research and limitations. 
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2. Literature Review 
Money laundering activities brings harm to the world regardless which country involved in. It has been 
estimated that some 500 billion money is laundered through financial markets each year. Such huge amount of 
money could not be laundered without the involvement from third party such as accountants or other professions 
who use their expertise to create complex transactions to conceal the legal activity (Mitchell, Sikka, & Willmott, 
1998). The lack of compliance with global AML/CFT standards in these countries' regulatory, financial, and legal 
systems that money laundering with or without any relationship to the financing of terrorism, would be relatively 
easy to achieve (Johnson, 2008).Some countries realized these risks and, therefore, adopted measures in an attempt 
to prevent the misuse of non-financial businesses and professions in money laundering and terrorism financing 
(MENAFATF, 2008). The group that have been listed under DNFBPs are casinos, real estate agents, dealers in 
precious metals, dealers in precious stones, lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and 
accountants, trusts and company service providers. 
The risk related to lawyers and accountants lie basically in the potential misuse of these professions in 
concealing the identities of the beneficiary owners of the transactions done through them. For example, 
establishment of companies or other complex legal arrangements (like trusts), as such services may conceal the 
link between the proceeds of the crimes and the criminals, execution of financial operations on behalf of 
customers, like cash deposit or withdrawal, foreign currency exchange operations, sale and purchase of shares, 
sending and receiving international money transfers and filing of fictitious lawsuits to obtain a judgment to 
legitimize the funds (MENAFATF, 2008).  
Meanwhile, offenders of money laundering and terrorism financing participate in real estate sectors and engage 
in a series of transactions designed to conceal the illicit source of funds; these transactions falls under the layering 
phase, where the offenders invest as tourists in order to acquire a legitimate appearance (integration phase) as well 
as buying and selling of real estate properties in fictitious names. An example of modus operandi for this group is 
where the money launderer announced price of purchase lesser than the real value of the property and then the sale 
is made at the real price, as the money launderer searches for a real estate seller who would cooperate with him, 
agree to declare the sale of the real estate property at a specific price (less than the real value of the real estate 
property) and accept to take the difference “under the table”. The money launderer buys for instance a real estate 
property worth USD 2 million at USD 1 million and pays secretly to the seller another million; then, he would sell 
the property at its real value of USD 2 million and it would appear that the seller achieved a profit of USD 1 
million. This fund would falsely appear to be legitimate (MENAFATF, 2008). 
On the other hand, money launderers tend to involve in transactions involving precious stones and metals since 
precious metals, particularly gold, has a high actual value and can be found in relatively small sizes, thus 
facilitating its transport, purchase and sale in several regions around the world. Gold also preserves its value 
regardless of its form whether it comes in the form of bullions or golden articles. Dealers are often interested in 
gold more than gems as it may be melted to change its form while preserving its value. Diamonds can also be 
traded around the world easily as the small size of diamond stones and their high value facilitate their concealment 
and transport and make it one of the most gems and jewels with the risk of being misused as a money laundering 
means. In some cases, it was noted that diamonds are used as a means to finance terrorist acts and groups. Gold is 
used in money laundering operations whether it is acquired in an illicit manner (like theft or smuggling) where it 
constitutes proceeds of a crime and is therefore deemed to be an illicit fund, or is used as a money laundering 
means through the purchase of gold against illicit funds (MENAFATF, 2008). 
Gambling in casino takes place in cash, which encompasses high risks that gamblers may use them in ML since 
they give money launderers a ready justification for obtaining a fortune with no legitimate source. Casinos are 
misused in ML operations in the first phase of ML (placement) where the intended-laundered-funds are 
transformed from cash money into cheques by the money launderer purchasing chips. The money launderer will 
later request repayment through a cheque drawn on the account of the casino. 
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It is worth to study this group as it is found that apart from the main financial sectors, designated nonǦfinancial 
sectors and highǦrisk customers involved businesses are also vulnerable for money laundering, such as nonǦ
financial designated business and professions, and politically exposed persons (Ai, 2012).  In recommendation of 
FATF, countries should require DNFBPs to identify, assess and take effective action to mitigate their money 
laundering and terrorist financing risks (FATF Financial Action Task Force, 2012). Presently, there are four main 
recommendations under preventive measures on DNFBPs.  
2.1. Recommendation 12 
The customer due diligence and record keeping requirements set out in Recommendations 5, 6, and 8 to 11 
apply to DNFBPs in the following situations when customers engage in financial transactions equal to or above the 
applicable designated threshold and when they engage in any cash transaction with a customer equal to or above 
the applicable designated threshold. It is also apply to situation where when they prepare for or carry out 
transactions for their client concerning the buying and selling real estate, managing client money and other assets 
(FATF Financial Action Task Force, 2012). Customer Due Diligence (CDD) is very crucial to prevent money 
laundering and terrorism financing. A transaction across border without supervision has opened the opportunity for 
criminals to commit crime. The institution that failed to monitor and supervise their customer who uses their 
services may lead them into trouble. CDD mainly focuses on practical issues such as exchanges in supervisory 
information, cross border inspections to improve the supervisory coordination and enable country to exercise 
consolidated supervision. This is to prevent information on customer accounts from being misused by cross border 
entities (Freeland, 2003). There still remain loopholes maintaining secrecy laws that hinder international 
cooperation and some private actors have failed to implement preventive measures such as Customer Due 
Diligence (CDD). All of the above failures and weaknesses hamper the effectiveness of the AML/CFT regime 
against money launderers and terrorists (Verdugo, 2008). 
2.2. Recommendation 12 
Recommendation 16 is about suspicious transaction reporting. Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal 
professionals and accountants should be required to report suspicious transactions when, on behalf of or for a 
client, they engage in a financial transaction in relation to the activities described in Recommendation 12(d). 
Countries are strongly encouraged to extend the reporting requirement on to the metals and dealers in precious 
stones where they should be required to report suspicious transactions when they engage in any cash transaction 
with a customer equal to or above the applicable designated threshold. Trust and company service providers should 
be required to report suspicious transactions for a client when, on behalf of or for a client, they engage in a 
transaction in relation to the activities referred to Recommendation 12(e).  
Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals, and accountants acting as independent legal 
professionals, are not required to report their suspicions if the relevant information was obtained in circumstances 
where they are subject to professional secrecy or legal professional privilege (FATF Financial Action Task Force, 
2012). If they failed to acknowledge the suspicious transaction, the law will punish them under active concealment 
(Hall, 1995). Since the number of cases in money laundering is increasing, by having a proportion routine and 
suspicious report, it could lower the number of cases (Levi, 2002). Study by Chaikin (2009) stated that the FATF 
ratings of a country's compliance with international standards are objective, expert driven and consistent in 
application, but are limited as performance measures as they ignore the costs of anti-money laundering and STR 
measures. Besides that, evaluation of national STR systems is limited because of lack of reliable statistics on the 
extent of money laundering. Though there is a significant increase in the STRs filed, the impact of money 
laundering and terrorism financing is neither realized in terms of money laundering related convictions nor 
confiscations (Viritha, Mariappan, & Haq, 2015). There is a need to study in depth of this STR in order to cater the 
whole concept of DNFBPs. 
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2.3. Recommendation 17, 24 and 25 
This recommendation is focused on the regulations (sanctions), supervision and monitoring guidance. 
Countries should ensure that there is a range of effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, whether criminal, 
civil or administrative, available to deal with natural or legal persons that fail to comply with AML/CFT 
requirements. Sanctions should be applicable not only to financial institutions and DNFBPs, but also to their 
directors and senior management (FATF Financial Action Task Force, 2012). The use of sanctions in 
recommendation 17 could help the country in effectively curbing money laundering and terrorism financing. The 
effective rules and sanctions could benefit country to fully meet the compliance (Masciandaro, 2004). 
Recommendation 24 is about supervision where effective systems for monitoring and ensuring their compliance 
with requirements to AML/CFT is used. This should be performed on a risk sensitive basis. This may be 
performed by a government authority or by an appropriate self-regulatory organization, provided that such an 
organization can ensure that its members comply with their obligations to AML/CFT (FATF Financial Action 
Task Force, 2012). Money laundering could distort economic data and also policy making. By having the 
supervision measures, it could help to induce the confident in financial markets (Quirk, 1997). Meanwhile, 
recommendation 25 is about monitoring guidance. The competent authorities should establish guidelines, and 
provide feedback which will assist financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions in 
applying national measures to AML/CFT, and in particular, in detecting and reporting suspicious transactions 
(FATF Financial Action Task Force, 2012). 
 
2.4 Recommendation 20 
 
Recommendation 20 is about other NFBPs and modern secured transactions. It is about the least used of cash 
transactions (Laundering, 2006). It is believed that the minimum use of cash could prevent the money laundering 
activity from occur. Some of the countries are replacing the cheque with modern secured retail payment 
instruments, automated direct debit and debit transfer and electronic bill payment systems. This is because most of 
money laundering activities rely mostly on cash. Large cash transaction could lead to potential money laundering 
(Senator et al., 1995).  
Thus, this study would focus on the compliance for each country under the APG regime on these DNFBPs 
preventive measures. The study would be done by analyzing the mutual evaluation reports produced by APG. This 
mutual evaluation report is evaluated by FATF peers where assessors from member countries carry out on site 
assessments on implementation and prepare a detailed report on compliance. 
19 Normah Omar and Zulaikha Amirah Johari /  Procedia Economics and Finance  28 ( 2015 )  14 – 23 
 
 
 
3. Research Methodology 
The mutual evaluation report on Anti Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism for 
countries under Asia Pacific Group regime is being analysed for the purpose of the study. The reason of analysing 
the evaluation report is to review the compliance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Forty 
Recommendations. Members of the society would carry out on site assessment regarding the recommendation 
implementation and compliance. 
The focus would be on the preventive measures on DNFBPs. This is due the massive issues governing the 
professionals which are involved in money laundering activities. Analysis of the data is carried out based on the 
compliance of each country in regards of the recommendation outline by FATF. The recommendations are 1) 
Recommendation 12: Customer Due Diligence (CDD) 2) Recommendation 16: Suspicious Transaction Reporting 
3) Recommendation 17, 24 and 25: Regulation, Supervision and Monitoring 4) Recommendation 20: Other 
Nonfinancial Business and Professions (NFBPs). In this study, 40 countries would be taken as a sample in 
analysing the compliance. 
4. Findings and Discussion 
Recommendation 12 received 31 non-compliant ratings meanwhile other 9 received partially compliant. 
Basically, the reasons of countries did not received full compliance from this recommendation is due to 
implementation of CDD and record keeping. Some countries have the guideline but yet to be implemented and 
some implement it but not thoroughly. CDD and record keeping implementation is very important to identify the 
complex or unusual transactions, unusual patterns of transaction that more likely to be the nature of money 
laundering and terrorism financing. The non-compliant rating states that the countries received non-compliant due 
to lack of effectiveness in terms of CDD and record keeping. Besides that, the countries also do not have 
mandatory CDD and record keeping requirements and also the authorities did not give any special attention to the 
complex and unusual transaction. Despite of the issues of effectiveness, some of the country did not include yet the 
CDD and record keeping in the AML/CFT regime and not all the DNFBPs sectors are required to follow the CDD 
and record keeping. Only specific sector such as trust and company services providers are required to do so.  
Lastly, the largest weakness of implementation of recommendation 12 is that the scope of CDD exemptions is 
unclear and could be interpreted as exempting a large number of transactions. The countries find it hard to define 
the clear guideline for the professionals to follow. In terms of partially compliant ratings under this 
recommendation, there is no ongoing due diligence on the settler, beneficiaries and transactions for trust 
managements in cases where the trustee has no control over the administration of the trust. Besides that, key CDD 
and record keeping obligations is not included in law or regulation to collect information on beneficiaries of trust. 
The thresholds for CDD for occasional transactions differ from those of the FATF. Moreover, this 
recommendation only extended to the domestic trust companies and real estate agents and also little evidences of 
effective implementation given in the recent introduction of the CDD requirements. As per suggested by FATF, 
the countries should acquire knowledge about firm’s client and prospective clients and to verify their identity as 
well as monitor business relationships and transactions. In addition, there is a must for record keeping, including 
details of customer due diligence and supporting evidence for business relationships, which need to be kept for five 
years after the end of a relationship and records of transactions, which also need to be kept for five years. 
Under recommendation 16 (Suspicious Transaction Reporting) 29 countries out of 40 received non-compliant 
meanwhile 10 countries received partially compliant and only 1 country received largely compliant. As money 
laundering and terrorism financing are often transnational crimes that are not bound by geographical boundaries or 
sovereign jurisdiction, it is imperative that STR is allowed to cooperate and exchange relevant information with its 
foreign counterparts. It could help authority to share information with its foreign counterparts provided there is an 
arrangement with the foreign agency for the sharing of information on the basis of reciprocity and confidentiality. 
From the ratings it can be concluded that the main reason countries did not receive the full compliant is because 
their STR implementation is yet to be effective especially in terms of training. The countries which received non-
compliant ratings is due to not filed suspicious transaction reporting, not enforcing reporting requirements, no 
internal control policies and controls. Furthermore, the countries are not required develop internal policies, 
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procedures, internal controls, ongoing employee training and compliance in respect of AML/CFT. In terms of 
partially compliant, the legal professions and accountants in the countries are not subjected to STR reporting 
obligation. Besides that, the effectiveness of STR regime is as yet untested in those countries. Most of the system 
of monitoring unusual transactions is generally based on cash threshold rather than analysis of transactions against 
client profile. The country that received largely compliant under this recommendation is due to the attempted 
transactions that are suspicious in nature and the fact that the country has not explicitly made a requirement for 
reporting. 
On the other hand, the reasons of countries received noncompliant under recommendation 17, 24 and 25 
(Regulation, Supervision and Monitoring) is because of absence of mechanisms for monitoring and ensuring 
compliance of DNFBPs with AML/CFT requirements, not all DNFBPs sector are required to follow the CDD and 
record keeping (trust and company services providers, TCSPs), absence of neither system for supervising 
AML/CFT obligations of DNFBPs at the time of the onsite mission nor for providing guidance or feedback. In 
terms of partially compliant, there is lack of effective regulatory and supervisory systems for monitoring to ensure 
compliance with AML/CFT requirements. The countries only adopt a risk base approach to determine the method 
and degree of monitoring to apply to each of the covered sectors of DNFBPs. The weaknesses is also obvious in 
effectiveness of compliance monitoring and absence of onsite examinations, inadequate resources for effective 
supervision of entities under the responsibility of FIU and absence of AML/CFT requirements for dealers in 
precious metals and stones. Furthermore, the competent authorities have not yet provide DNFBPs with guidelines 
to assist DNFBPs implement and comply with their respective regulations. In terms of largely compliant, the 
countries is lacking of sufficiently tailored guidance from the authorities. 
As for recommendation 20, most countries received compliant ratings because there is encouragement of using 
modern and secure techniques for conducting financial transactions that are less vulnerable to money laundering. 
However, as for non-compliant ratings, there is encouragement of using modern and secure techniques for 
conducting financial transactions that are less vulnerable to money laundering in those countries. Meanwhile, for 
partially and largely compliant, the countries only taken limited measures to encourage the development and use of 
modern and secure techniques for conducting financial transactions that are less vulnerable to money laundering 
and terrorism financing and there are still gaps with effective measures to encourage the development and use of 
modern and secure techniques for conducting financial transactions that are less vulnerable to money laundering 
respectively. Table 1 presents the summary of compliant rating in APG mutual evaluation report and table 2 
presents the summary of compliance ratings for each country. Meanwhile, Figure 1 presents the summary of rating 
compliant based on recommendation. 
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Table 1. Summary of Compliants Rating in APG Mutual Evaluation Report 
Recommendation Noncompliant Partially Compliant Largely Compliant Compliant 
12 
Customer Due 
Diligence and record 
keeping 
x Lack of effectiveness in terms of CDD and record keeping 
x Do not have mandatory on CDD and record keeping 
requirements. 
x No special attention to the complex and unusual transaction 
x Not yet included in the AML/CFT regime (Bangladesh) 
x Not all the DNFBPs sector are required to follow the CDD 
and record keeping (trust and company services providers, 
TCSPs) 
x The scope of CDD exemptions is unclear and could be 
interpreted as exempting a large number of transactions 
x No ongoing due diligence on the settler, beneficiaries and 
transactions for trust managements in cases where the trustee has no 
control over the administration of the trust. 
x Key CDD and record keeping obligations is not included in law or 
regulation to collect information on beneficiaries of trust. The 
thresholds for CDD for occasional transactions differ from those of 
the FATF. 
x This recommendation only extended to the domestic trust companies 
and real estate agents and also little evidences of effective 
implementation given in the recent introduction of the CDD 
requirements. 
- - 
16 
Suspicious 
Transaction Reporting 
(STR) 
x Do not filed STRs, not enforcing reporting requirements, no 
internal control policies and controls 
x Not required to develop internal policies, procedures, 
internal controls, ongoing employee training and compliance 
in respect of AML/CFT 
x Not yet included in AML/CFT regime 
x Not all DNFBPs sector are required to follow the CDD and 
record keeping (trust and company services providers, 
TCSPs) 
x The legal professions and accountants are not subjected to STR 
reporting obligation. The effectiveness of STR regime is as yet 
untested. 
x AML/CFT system has not been implemented. System of monitoring 
unusual transactions is generally based on cash threshold rather than 
analysis of transactions against client profile. 
Attempted transactions that are suspicious in 
nature are not explicitly made a requirement 
for reporting. 
- 
17, 24 & 25 
Regulation, 
supervision and 
monitoring 
 
x No mechanisms for monitoring and ensuring compliance of 
DNFBPs with AML/CFT requirements. 
x Not yet included in AML/CFT regime 
x Not all DNFBPs sector are required to follow the CDD and 
record keeping (trust and company services providers, 
TCSPs) 
x No system for supervising AML/CFT obligations of 
DNFBPs at the time of the onsite mission nor for providing 
guidance or feedback. 
x Lack of effective regulatory and supervisory systems for monitoring 
to ensure compliance with AML/CFT requirements. 
x They only adopt a risk base approach to determine the method and 
degree of monitoring to apply to each of the covered sectors of 
DNFBPs. 
x Weaknesses in effectiveness of compliance monitoring and absence 
of onsite examinations, inadequate resources for effective 
supervision of entities under the responsibility of FIU and absence of 
AML/CFT requirements for dealers in precious metals and stones. 
x Competent Authorities have not yet provide DNFBPs with 
guidelines to assist DNFBPs implement and comply with their 
respective. 
Lack of sufficiently tailored guidance - 
20 
Modern Transaction 
Technique 
x No implementation of existing provisions to limit the use of 
cash in the economy. 
x No risk assessment had been conducted, the authorities are 
not in position to identify whether other than DNFBPs are at 
risk of being misused for money laundering or terrorist 
financing purposes and would require being subjected to the 
AML/CFT framework. 
Only taken limited measures to encourage the development and use of 
modern and secure techniques for conducting financial transactions that are 
less vulnerable to money laundering and terrorism financing. 
There are still gaps with effective measures to 
encourage the development and use of 
modern and secure techniques for conducting 
financial transactions that are less vulnerable 
to money laundering. 
There is 
encouragement 
of using modern 
and secure 
techniques for 
conducting 
financial 
transactions that 
are less 
vulnerable to 
money 
laundering. 
22   Normah Omar and Zulaikha Amirah Johari /  Procedia Economics and Finance  28 ( 2015 )  14 – 23 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Summary of Compliant Rating for 40 Countries 
5. Conclusion 
Traditionally, the financial sector is often seen as the gatekeepers of the Anti-money Laundering/Counter 
Terrorism Financing regime. Increasingly, governments and law enforcement agencies recognize the importance 
of designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) in the combat against money laundering and 
terrorism financing activities. A review of APG mutual evaluation for 15 jurisdictions reveals that a significant 
number of countries were assessed to be either non-compliant, partially compliant largely compliant or full 
compliant with the FATF Recommendations 12, 16, 17, 20, 24 and 25. The analysis of the review indicated that 
there are still compliance issues in areas that might afford exploitative opportunities for criminals and organised 
crime groups. Most countries, for example, were deemed to be non-compliant in relation to there being no 
monitoring system and not fulfilling the requirement from FATF especially under recommendation 12, 16, 17, 24 
and 25. This could have the undesired result of regulatory image where criminals and organised crime groups take 
advantage of a regulatory difference to facilitate their money laundering activities. However, in terms of modern 
transaction techniques, most of the countries are following the suit. While, the remaining followed the 
recommendations but still there are some fractions that need to be improved. FATF need to be more stringent on 
this compliance issue because by doing so it could help to curb terrorism financing and money laundering. This 
study is only limited to the results publish by APG from the mutual evaluation report. Future research could look 
deep into the DNFBPs operations and functions to search for the details on how they operate. 
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